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The school quasi-market in French-speaking Belgium is characterised by segregation of 
various types.  Efforts to apply measures that encourage greater social mixing have met 
with stiff resistance and various difficulties. In 2008 and 2009, a significant amount of 
turbulence was caused by the application of the "social mixing" law influencing the 
registration procedures for students in secondary education. The purpose of this article is 
to present some results from a prospective research project that investigated the 
possibility of modifying the formula for financing schools, the foundation of the quasi-
market mechanism. To do this, a generalised formula for allocating funds to schools 
according to need is proposed on the basis of legislation currently in force in the French 
Community of Belgium. Then, the solution tested is presented with a financing formula 
that takes into account indicators of the social composition of the school population. 
Various scenarios of differentiated financing of schools according to these indicators are 
presented, through simulations using real data on the effects of these scenarios in terms 
of gains and losses first for all schools, and then for different contrasting schools 
thereafter. Finally, the implications of these scenarios are discussed and put into 
perspective with respect to the different solutions considered since 2005 in French-
speaking Belgium.  
 
Keywords: Prospective, social mixing, regulation 
1. Introduction  
1.1 Managing diversity, taking disparities into account 
It is undoubtedly unnecessary to remind the reader that not all educational systems are 
organised in the same way, particularly in terms of the means by which they take into 
account the diversity of the students in their schools and the way this diversity is 
manifested in the various institutions. In order to take this into consideration, it is 
useful to consider several levels of analysis – from the most macroscopic level to the 
organisation of individual classes and learning groups – and a large number of 
variables, such as for example the more or less public nature of education and the 
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2 This article presents certain results of an interuniversity research project commissioned by the 
Government of the French Community of Belgium in the framework of priority 9 of the 
"Contrat pour l’École".  The research was carried out by Marc Demeuse, Antoine 
Derobertmasure, Nathanaël Friant and Nathalie Verdale for the University of Mons-Hainaut; 
and Christian Monseur, Thomas Herremans and Simon Uyttendaele for the University of 
Liège. 
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place of private schools (subsidised or not) in the system, the uniform or situation-
adapted
3
 means of financing, the existence of monitoring mechanisms (for example 
through nationwide examinations), and the means of correcting disparities
4
. These 
examples highlight the variety of principles and means that can intervene to limit gaps 
in performance between different schools (Demeuse & Baye, 2007; Mons, 2007).  
 
Certain systems – at least in their rhetoric – are based on a stringent 
equalisation of funding to allow the merits of each student to shine through: this is the 
ideal of the Republican school in France.  Other systems favour adapted and 
differentiated funding in order to ensure a true equalisation of results, at least in 
compulsory education, as is the case in educational systems in Northern Europe. Still 
other systems, rather rare, historically favour private initiative through great 
autonomy and sometimes even public financing. This is the case in Belgium. In such a 
context, where the public authority plays at best a subsidiary role as one of several 
organisers of education, this authority has very little leverage to encourage a certain 
social mixing or an equalisation of results other than in the way it allocates public 
funds to all educational operators, public and private. It is in this very particular and 
extremely open context that the authors propose to consider the mechanisms of 
regulating school and social disparities by means of differentiating allocation of 
school funding.  
 
 
                                                 
3
 For example, the existence of compensatory policies favouring some populations considered as 
underprivileged, for instance in the case of the famous “Title I” in the United States (Borman, 
Stringfield & Slavin, 2001). 
4
 Such as the possibility of closing certain schools that are not considered efficient (“failing schools”) 
or distributing “vouchers” that allow the most underprivileged students to leave these schools and go to 
schools that are considered more efficient.  
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1.2. In the French Community of Belgium: a quasi-market 
It is useful here to describe the context of the French Community of Belgium and the 
quasi-market nature of its education system. Education in Belgium is based on the 
constitutional right of "freedom of education" (article 24 of the Constitution of 18 
February 1831), granting parents the possibility to choose their child's school. This 
freedom of choice is combined with public financing of education - including private 
schools - and a method of calculating the financing of each institution according to the 
number of students registered. Different authors (Vandenberghe, 1998; Delvaux, 
Demeuse and Dupriez, 2005) have characterised this context as a school quasi-market.  
 
Following this logic, pupils have not only a "financial" value, because their 
numbers determine the subsidies awarded to each institution (first-order competition), 
but also a "pedagogical" value based on their more or less desirable personal traits 
(second-order competition) (Maroy, 2006). Schoolchildren that conform to school 
norms will be that much easier for the school to manage. Numerous authors have in 
addition demonstrated that peers play an  important role in a pupil's learning (Slavin, 
1990; Duru-Bellat & Mingat, 1997; Vandenberghe, 1998; Crahay, 2000; Ireson & 
Hallam, 2001; Dupriez & Draelants, 2003; Monseur and Crahay, 2008): while 
learning, a pupil is influenced by the characteristics of the other pupils in his class or 
school.  In fact, teachers are also influenced by the composition of the group of pupils 
in their classroom and adapt the demands of the curriculum and the evaluation to 
these pupils (Thrupp, 1999; Thrupp & al., 2002; Dumay, 2004).  
 
The school hopes to respond appropriately to parents' choices by providing 
quality education and in turn cultivate a certain demand from parents. A school that 
does not satisfy the most demanding parents will see them withdraw their children, 
taking with them the funds that allow the school to operate and thus reducing the 
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resources available. In light of this, it is understandable that schools are not only in 
competition but also interdependent. This is what Delvaux and Joseph (2003) have 
called competitive interdependence between institutions: “the distribution of pupils, 
mainly determined by the free choice of parents but also by the relegation processes 
that exist between institutions, produces hierarchical positions among schools and 
these influence the strategies and actions that headmasters develop in their 
institutions and that are "formally" in their zone of autonomy. Schools located in the 
same local space are interdependent insofar as the workings of a school depend on its 
position in the local school hierarchy and indirectly on the workings of the other 
institutions in this space".  
 
1.3. A quasi-market and… a marked segregation between schools 
These particularities of the educational system in French-speaking Belgium foster 
segregation of schools and create several "types" of schools on a continuum from 
"ghetto" schools to "sanctuary" schools. Different examples of segregation have been 
observed in numerous studies (Crahay, 2000; Demeuse et al., 2005; Baye et al., 2004; 
Vandenberghe, 2000; Delvaux and Joseph, 2003; Demeuse and Baye, 2007; 2008), 
and updated in 2008 (Friant et al., 2008). Not only are there great socio-economic 
disparities between schools, related to the type of programmes they offer, but also, 
when we look at the institutions on the extreme ends of this continuum, we see that 
the situation is worsening: the most privileged institutions dispose of their most 
underprivileged pupils, whereas the most underprivileged schools cannot keep their 
most privileged pupils.  
 
Acknowledging this, the Government of the French Community of Belgium 
set out to encourage social mixing within schools, in particular through the "Contrat 
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pour l’Ecole" (2005). To do this, two complementary lines of action were proposed: 
regulating registration and differentiating financing. In the first case, the motivation is 
to ensure that all parents receive truly identical treatment (setting up a registration 
record in all schools, managing enrolment according to common and identical rules 
avoiding favouritism). In the second case, by balancing the recruitment of more 
"difficult" schoolchildren with a larger school staff, the legislator aims to compensate 
for these difficulties by increasing funding and manpower. In this article, we will 
concentrate on the second type of action.  
1.4. One action to study: differentiated financing 
While actions aimed at greater social mixing by regulating school registration have 
been implemented (the "registration" law in 2007 and the "social mixing" law in 
2008) and greatly criticised, the idea of instating differentiated financing is following 
another path, initially inspired by a compensatory approach. The "Contrat pour 
l’École" initiated this project by studying the efficiency and feasibility of directly 
linking the calculation of the number of teaching hours to the socio-economic 
background of each pupil in the school (Contrat pour l’école, 2005, p. 46). The 
interuniversity research project commissioned by the Government to be performed by 
the universities of Mons-Hainaut and Liège had the goal of setting up new measures 
to fight school segregation thanks to a modulation of the financing of primary and 
secondary schools (Demeuse et al., 2007). This article presents some of the results of 
this research: the development of a general formula for financing institutions and of a 
simulation tool making it possible to establish different financing scenarios. These 
scenarios are compared with the differentiated resource allocation  solution finally 
proposed by the Government at the beginning of 2009.  
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In this commissioned research project, the relationships and the nature of the 
roles established between politics and science are part of the third step in the 
evolution of educational research described by Aubert-Lotarski et al. (2007): 
prospective research. In this kind of research, the implication of researchers in the 
outfitting, even the definition, of policies to come constitutes an important change: 
abandoning an essentially descriptive or explanatory method, this new approach is 
geared towards defining solutions or scenarios that have a good chance of meeting 
objectives in the long term. The first prototype of this kind of research was made in 
the French Community of Belgium in the context of an interuniversity research 
project on school districts (Delvaux et al, 2005). 
2. A tool for the commissioned research: the incentive power of financing 
formulas  
2.1. What are financing formulas?  
The stake of research is to formalise and test means of equitably allocating resources 
according to the needs of institutions while encouraging social mixing. The request 
made to our research team was fulfilled by implementing a general formula for 
allocating funds according to needs similar to the formulas developed by the 
International Institute for Educational Planning (UNESCO) and summarised by Ross 
and Levacic (1999).  
 
As a general rule, financing formulas have four components (Ross & Levacic, 
1999): (1) a basic student allocation (BSA), (2) an increase in the basic student 
allocation according to the curriculum (CE), (3) additional funds for students with 
special educational needs (SEN) and (4) additional funds for school sites needs 
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(SSN)
5
. For the moment in French-speaking Belgium, these four components are 
represented in a set of calculations that have been modified and added to with each 
new political impetus and whose coherence is rather difficult to understand. 
Simplifying it as much as possible, the current formula for allocating funds in terms of 
personnel in mainstream education in French-speaking Belgium can be summarised as 
follows:  
Funding for personnel = (BSA * CE) + SEN + SSN 
 
 
The basic student allocation (BSA) corresponds to the number of teachers per 
capita, according to the number of students, but these resources are not distributed 
equally according to the curriculum of the students: for example, technical and 
vocational schools have a greater workforce than general education (CE). It is useful 
therefore to take into account a multiplier coefficient associated with the type of 
studies. Additional funding for students with special educational needs (SEN) exists 
in the educational system in French-speaking Belgium, through positive 
discrimination
6
 and in special education. Finally, the specific school sites needs (SSN) 
are taken into account in the appropriation of operating funds and in the calculation of 
the staff according to brackets of students, also taking into consideration the size of 
the institution, with smaller institutions and older public institutions receiving 
proportionally higher operating funds. 
 
                                                 
5
 The acronyms are based on the English formulation of Ross and Levacic (1999): Basic student 
allocation (BSA), Curriculum enhancement (CE), Supplementary educational needs (SEN), 
School sites needs (SSN).  
6
 For a description of the positive discrimination policy in French-speaking Belgium, see Friant, N., 
Demeuse, M., Aubert-Lotarski, A. & Nicaise, I. (2008). “En Belgique. Deux modes de 
régulation des effets d’une logique de quasi-marché”. In M. Demeuse, D. Frandji, D. Greger, 
& J-Y. Rochex (Eds), Les politiques d’éducation prioritaire en Europe: Conceptions, mises en 
œuvre, débats. Lyon: INRP. 
M. Demeuse et al. 
The present research has attempted to build a financing formula that includes a 
socioeconomic factor and that is both equitable and an incentive for social mixing 
within institutions. In order to modulate the allocation of funds, the general formula is 
fed by objective indicators of the situation of institutions. The indicators built 
represent segregational mechanisms at work in the institutions of the French 
Community of Belgium. These indicators
7
 can then be introduced into a general 
financing formula in order to compensate for these mechanisms and to incite schools 
to take the risk of having a more heterogeneous school population. In this article, we 
will only consider the case of the weighting of school financing according to the 
socio-economic status of pupils. Because we are dealing with weighting, the SEN 
component is no longer additive but multiplicative and the formula is transformed as 
follows:  
Funding for personnel = (BSA * CE) * SEN + SSN 
 
 
This type of formula fills three main functions - equitable distribution of 
resources, incentive, regulation of the market
8
 -, in such a way that it responds to the 
political will by modulating the allocation of resources according to the characteristics 
of the population of each school. The objective of social mixing brings into play the 
"incentive" function of financing formulas: the formula has the purpose of 
encouraging (and/or sanctioning, in the "Robin Hood" case that we will refer to later) 
the strategies of institutions with respect to the objectives defined by educational 
policy.  
                                                 
7
 For more information about the construction of the indicators see Friant et al., 2008 
8
 Equity function, Directive function and market regulation function (Ross & Levacic, 1999, pp. 29-
30). 
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2.2. What is the theoretical basis for the use of the incentive function of financing 
formulas?  
From a conceptual point of view, the arguments in favour of implementing such a 
procedure come from the rational choice theory. According to Rule (quoted by 
Meadwell, 2002; Smith, 2002), "human action is essentially instrumental" (Meadwell, 
2002, p.118) and the actors are looking for, rationally, lines of action that emphasise 
the "maximisation of the usefulness of the actor" (Haine, 1999). Consequently, the 
decisions of the actors are made taking into account and comparing the cost and profit 
factors. This theory is anchored on the postulates that "information is presumed 
perfect, all of the options are known and measured, the preferences defined, set, 
transitive and complete" (Haine, 1999).  The actor needs to know and rank his 
options.  He also needs to know how to reach his goal and have the material means to 
actually attain it. Conversely, the main barriers to implementing rational choices can 
be summarised as follows: impossibility to choose between two equal options, lack of 
information allowing the actor to compare different options available in full 
knowledge of the considerations involved and persistence of beliefs and uncertainties 
pertaining to the expected outcomes of the action (Gazibo & Jenson, 2004). 
According to these principles, the different categories of actors can be guided by 
specific interests: “For example, if they are people buying and selling, maximizing 
wealth seems a reasonable assumption. If they are peasants in risky environments, 
maximizing security has some appeal. In the case of government actors, the presumption 
is that they want to stay in power.” (Levi, 1997, p.24). 
 
It is difficult to apply models of neoclassical economy as is to the study of 
school quasi-markets, as Felouzis and Perroton (2007) have demonstrated.  They 
propose an analysis in terms of economics of quality. However, we make the 
following hypothesis when transposing the rational choice theory to the context of a 
M. Demeuse et al. 
highly hierarchical school quasi-market: if we accept that any school, personified by 
its head, tries to maximise its teaching staff, we can assume that rational choices will 
be made in order to attain this goal. The means that the school head can use to this end 
will depend upon the implementation of a policy of social mixing among 
schoolchildren in order to obtain optimal financing from the public authorities if the 
compensatory mechanisms are sufficient with respect to the supposed difficulty that 
this social mixing may engender. Accordingly, the dissemination of information 
related to financing measures must be guaranteed at least for schools.  
 
However, the maximisation of the teaching staff does not apply to every actor. 
In the workings of the French-speaking Belgian school quasi-market, the 
maximisation of the “quality” of the public recruited also plays an important role 
(second-order competition). In a context of weak differentiation in teaching 
workforce, schools do not get any “profit” in having an underprivileged public, except 
in the case of positive discrimination schools. Because it is easier, for school 
workforces of the same size, to educate a certain type of public, institutions in a high 
position in the local school hierarchy (Delvaux & Joseph, 2003) select pupils with a 
privileged background.  This is true although until now there has been no monitoring 
of the quality effectively produced by each institution, contrary to the English 
system
9
. In this sense, the use of a formula that weights school staff funding according 
to the social status of pupils could make it possible to favour the recruiting of 
underprivileged pupils, as long as the supplementary means are considered sufficient 
and the supposed results (because they are not measured effectively via national 
                                                 
9
 Eurybase (2007/08). The Education System in England, Wales, Northern Ireland. Retrieved October 
20, 2009, from: 
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/eurybase/eurybase_full_reports/UN_
EN.pdf  
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examinations, for example) remain acceptable in terms of client expectations - parents 
who wish to entrust their children to institutions that take the risk of modifying their 
recruitment policy.  
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3. Method 
3.1. Corpus of data 
 
In order to build the indicators necessary for modulating the financing formula, we 
needed to work with reliable data on all of the schools in the French Community of 
Belgium, all levels combined (nursery, primary and secondary school). Because of the 
type and quantity of data required, we decided to work with data from the school 
population census used in the allocation of school funds, provided by the educational 
administration
10
.  
 
Three data tables were used, each one corresponding to one census year of 
students in the French Community of Belgium: school years 2003-2004, 2004-2005 
and 2005-2006. Each of these data tables contains as many records
11
 as students 
counted in the French Community of Belgium (approximately 860,000 per year), as 
well as the variables used in calculating the budget allocated to each institution and in 
constituting the general statistics for education (such as the school attended, the study 
level and track, the birthdate, the home country and municipality, the certificates 
earned and a socio-economic index score). 
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 In particular, the "Entreprise des Technologies Nouvelles de l’Information et de la Communication" 
(ETNIC) 
11
 The records were made anonymous by the administration, which only retained a random 
identification number assigned to each student to allow mergers over several years. 
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An important variable for our research is the socio-economic status of the 
students. It is represented by a socio-economic index
12
 (in the rest of this document, 
we will use the abbreviation "SES") present in the data tables and initially built to 
implement the policy of positive discrimination (Demeuse et al., 1999; Demeuse and 
Monseur, 1999).  
3.2. Construction of indicators at the level of the institution 
These data tables on the "student" level were aggregated at the level of schools, such 
that one record corresponds to one institution, and merged in order to establish an 
evolution over three consecutive years, including annual student flow (Demeuse and 
Delvaux, 2004). 
 
Once the tables were aggregated at the level of the institution, different 
indicators were created related to the institutions. On the one hand they reflect the 
structure of the population of the institutions, and on the other hand the population 
flow to and from each of the institutions (Friant et al., 2008). Here we will focus only 
on the "average SES of the institution" variable.  
 
3.3. Development of a tool to simulate financing of institutions
13
 
The historical and educational context of the French Community of Belgium limits 
the means of action that the political authorities have, particularly in terms of 
                                                 
12
 The socio-economic index is based on the student's district of origin (the notion of district is a 
statistical division of the territory (Demeuse, 2002, p. 219). A synthetic socio-economic index 
score is assigned to each district in Belgium, on the basis of 11 variables within the framework 
of 6 domains (income per inhabitant, level of the certificates, unemployment rate, employment 
rate and proportion of people receiving welfare, professions, comfort of housing). Thus each 
student is assigned the socio-economic index score of the district where he lives and somehow 
brings this index score to the level of the institution. From a statistical point of view, this is a 
normal distribution metric variable that varies between -3.5 and 3.5. It is recalculated every 
three years on the basis of the latest statistics available.  
 
13
 The simulation tool was made by Simon Uyttendaele, University of Liège.  
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regulating the school quasi-market. The solution proposed in our research is to use 
economic leveraging, in this case through a change in the logic of financing schools. 
 
To allow the political authorities to identify the impact of their decisions, it 
was necessary to provide the proper equipment: a computer tool was developed to 
estimate the impact of each decision on the institutions and on the overall budget for 
education. This simulator therefore makes it possible to evaluate the impact (on the 
level of the entire educational system as well as at the level of each of the primary and 
secondary schools) of a change in the rules for calculating the teaching staff. 
 
To set up this simulator, it was first necessary to make a comparison between 
an existing situation (that can be considered the baseline) and a virtual situation that 
could exist later. Part of the development of the simulator depended on modelling the 
calculation of the number of teachers that a school can hire according to the rules 
currently in force. The software programme must be as flexible as possible and allow 
the parametering of financing scenarios according to pertinent criteria, such as the 
average socio-economic status of schools, the degree of grade repetition that is 
accepted or maintained in the school, the evolution of the school population with time 
or according to the school level considered… To this end, indicators of the social 
composition of the institutions and of their structure were calculated. But it is also 
necessary to establish a model that links financing to these characteristics: on the one 
hand, the idea is to propose a tool that breaks with the dichotomised financing used in 
the case of positive discrimination and, on the other hand, to propose a function that 
can either be increasing (for example, in the theoretical case of weighting of financing 
depending on results) or decreasing (for example, in the case of weighting of 
financing depending on the SES) (figure 1).  
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Figure 1 – The parametering window of the simulation tool: example of a decreasing 
curve (left) and of an increasing curve (right) 
 
The logistical function
14
  (figure 1 presents two possible illustrations) makes it 
possible to: 
 vary the minimum and maximum values of the weighting (y-axis); 
 vary the minimum and maximum values of the weighting indices (x-axis); 
 authorise increasing or decreasing functions;  
 modulate the slope of the function;  
 vary the moment where the increase/decrease begins and ends, that is, vary the 
point of inflexion of the mathematical function.  
The use of this function allows great flexibility. 
3.4. Simulation procedure 
The simulations on school financing were performed on real data from all of the 
primary schools in the French Community of Belgium.  A special effort was made to 
account for a maximum number of parameters to lead to realistic simulations. Two 
financing scenarios were simulated. The baseline was parametered using the budget, 
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a being the left asymptote, da being the right asymptote, a being the slope, and inf being the point of 
inflexion 
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the number of pupils per school and the calculation procedures in force for school 
year 2005-2006. The budget considered concerns only the number of teachers and 
equates to 4.5 billion euros, plus an additional budget awarded to certain 
underprivileged schools in the framework of priority education, equivalent to 0.45% 
of the total budget (approximately 22 million euros).  
 
This baseline, indicated by an arrow in figure 1, also appears in table 1: the 
formula does not modify the default parameters. Given that one pupil is equal to one 
pupil, both left and right asymptotes are set at 1; the slope is 0, and there is no point of 
inflexion. This baseline is the point of comparison for the further scenarios.   
Table 1 – Parameters related to the baseline 
 
 Left asymptote  Right 
asymptote  
Slope Point of 
inflexion 
Budget 
Baseline 1 1 0 - 100% 
 1 pupil =  1 
pupil, no matter 
the SES 
1 pupil =  1 
pupil, no matter 
the SES 
No differentiation in 
financing, so no 
slope 
No point of 
inflexion 
Unchanged 
budget 
 
Starting with this baseline, two financing scenarios (the logic used, the 
configuration of the software programme and the effects of these scenarios) are 
presented in the following section.   
 
To illustrate the effects the simulation scenarios could have, we have selected 
the case of two contrasting primary schools: one is underprivileged (school A), the 
other is slightly above average (school B). The distribution of the socio-economic 
index scores between schools is presented in figure 2.  
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Figure 2 – Distribution of SES by school (2005), with the positions of the two schools 
studied 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Two financing scenarios applied to two contrasting schools  
4.1.1. The incentive scenario based on redistribution: “Robin Hood”   
The first scenario takes into account the indicator related to the social composition 
(SES)
15
 of the school. We call it “Robin Hood” because it penalises schools whose 
pupils are on average privileged and that have little socio-economic mixing and gives 
more to the schools that are the most underprivileged, according to the following 
parametering (table 2 and figure 3).  
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 As a reminder, a negative value indicates that the pupils of the school are generally underprivileged. 
On the other hand, a positive value corresponds to the situation of a school whose pupils are 
mainly privileged. 
A B 
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Table 2 – Parameters related to the “Robin Hood” scenario  
 
 Left asymptote  Right asymptote  Slope Point of 
inflexion 
Budget 
Baseline 1 1 0 - 100% 
“Robin 
Hood” 
scenario 
1.6 0.8 2 0 100% 
a pupil from a 
highly 
underprivileged 
background is 
subsidised as 
1.6 pupils  
a pupil from a highly 
privileged 
background is 
subsidised as 0.8 
pupils  
Rapid 
change of 
weighting 
The change in 
weighting 
occurs around 
SES=0 
Unchanged 
budget 
 
 
In the case of this simulation scenario
16
, schools with a population that is 
socio-economically underprivileged receive more funding whereas schools with a 
privileged, or very privileged, population are penalised with financing per pupil under 
the level of 1. In this hypothetical case, the financing logic that was used combines a 
compensatory-type financing (“give the most to those who need it the most”) with an 
incentive-type financing in the case of homogenous schools whose pupils are mainly 
socio-economically privileged (penalisation in terms of financing).  
 
                                                 
16
 This simulation is made without increasing the overall budget awarded by the department of education for financing schools. 
Figure 2 - simulation of the “baseline” Figure 3 – “Robin Hood” simulation scenario 
A 
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Table 3 – effects of the “Robin Hood” scenario 
This table has 7 columns. The first column identifies the school
17
 whereas the 
second provides the socio-economic index score of the school. The following two 
columns concern the situation of the school before applying the “Robin Hood” 
scenario: the total number of teaching hours and the significance of this value in terms 
of numbers of full-time teachers that could be hired in this school. The next three 
columns are related to the situation in the school after applying the “Robin Hood” 
scenario: the number of teaching hours the school would receive after applying the 
scenario, the gross profits in terms of equivalent full time according to the scenario 
and finally the relative gains of the school - the division of the gross profits by the 
number of teachers before the application of the scenario. 
 
Reading table 3, it appears that the impact of the “Robin Hood” scenario is 
very different depending on the slot occupied by each of the schools in terms of 
average socio-economic index. School A is just above average (SES=0.33) while 
school B is very underprivileged (SES=-2.11). In the case of school A, the 
consequences of financing scenario 1 take the form of a reduced teaching staff, -1.8 
equivalent full time teachers, whereas in school B, the consequences of financing take 
the form of a better than 30% increase in teaching staff: the number of teachers rises 
from 8.8 to 11.3. 
 
                                                 
17 This was made impossible in order to respect the anonymity of the schools. 
 Baseline After the “Robin Hood” scenario 
School  
SES 
volume of 
teaching hours 
Number of 
full-time 
teachers 
volume of 
teaching 
hours 
Gain in 
full-time 
teachers 
Gain in 
teachers 
(relative) 
A 0.33 482 21.9 440 -1.8 -8.71% 
B -2.11 194 8.8 253 +2.5 +30.41% 
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4.1.2. A compensatory scenario that  adds new funding 
Although it is difficult to defend politically, the example of the “Robin Hood” 
scenario was chosen in this article because it truly implements an incentive for social 
mixing. More acceptable politically - taking into account the availability of 
supplementary funds - and faced with the contestation of laws that took on social 
mixing head on, the second simulation attempts to propose an undoubtedly more 
acceptable distribution of funds. In this second scenario, the will is to award more 
funds to schools with an underprivileged population, without sanctioning schools that 
educate a socio-economically privileged population, thanks to an overall increase in 
the budget (in comparison with the previous scenario, only the compensatory logic is 
retained here). We will call this the “compensatory scenario” in the rest of this article. 
Table 4 presents the parameters considered (presented in comparison with those 
retained in the “Robin Hood” scenario).  
 
Table 4 – Parameters related to the compensatory scenario 
 
 Left 
asymptote  
Right 
asymptote  
Slope Point of 
inflexion 
Budget 
Baseline 1 1 0 - 100% 
“Robin Hood” 
scenario 
1.6 0.8 2 0 100% 
Compensatory 
scenario  
1.4 1 0.5 -2 101% 
a pupil from a 
highly 
underprivileged 
background is 
financed as 1.4 
pupils  
the financing 
does not 
change for 
the most 
privileged 
pupils 
slow 
change in 
weighting 
the change 
in 
weighting 
occurs 
around 
SES=-2 
the total budget 
is increased by  
1% 
(approximately 
€40 M) 
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         Figure 4: simulation of the “baseline”               Figure 5: scenario of simulation 2 
 
This measure was reproduced in the following way (figure 5): increase in the 
budget
18
, parametering of the left asymptote at 1.40 (which means that a very 
underprivileged pupil will be financed as 1.4 pupils), the right asymptote at 1. The 
association of a slope of 0.5 to a point of inflexion parametered at 0.2 makes it 
possible to define the rapidity of the change in weighting as well as the beginning and 
the end of the change in weighting; in this case, the intention was to reproduce the 
political priorities, i.e. to concentrate the financial effort
19
 on schools with the most 
underprivileged population [the curve representing the distribution of financing meets 
the baseline around the value -0.8, which means that a pupil with a socio-economic 
index score higher than this value (de -0.8) does not have any positive financial 
weighting]. We see that applying this principle would make it possible, on one hand, 
for a large number of schools (located on the left of the x-axis) to increase teaching 
staff and, on another hand, for the rest of the schools (the ones on the right of the 
same axis) to not be restricted in terms of the level of hiring of teaching staff. 
                                                 
18 As a reminder, the first simulation was made without a budget modification. In the case of financing 
scenario 2, the budget was increased by 1%. 
19 The distribution of financing can be seen in figure 5 (see arrow) by taking into account the space 
between the curve and the horizontal line. 
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Concretely, the effects of applying this scenario can be investigated on the 
“school” level. Schools A and B, presented in the “Robin Hood” scenario, are 
represented in table 5.  The comments related to this table are made further in the 
section comparing the compensatory scenario to the solution proposed by the 
Government. 
Table 5 – effects of the compensatory scenario 
 Baseline After simulation scenario 2 (continuous 
distribution version) 
School SES volume of 
teaching hours  
Number of 
full-time 
teachers 
volume of 
teaching hours 
(simulation 1) 
Gain in full-
time teachers 
Gain in 
teachers 
(relative) 
A 0.33 482 21.9 483 + 0 + 0.21 % 
B -2.11 194 8.8 234 +1.7 +20.62% 
 
4.2. The solution proposed by the Government  
The financing measures implemented in the French Community of Belgium at the 
beginning of the 2009 school year were modelled after a bill proposed by the 
Government. They are characterised by an increase in the budget (from €22 million - 
0.45% of the total budget - it goes to €62 million - 1.35% of the total budget - for all 
levels of education) and a desire to concentrate supplementary funds in schools with 
an underprivileged population. The distribution of these funds is illustrated in figure 6 
drawn from a Government press release. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6 - illustration of the school workforce and financing according to the 
Government of the French Community (French Community, 2009) 
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The choice of the French Community – to prefer financing by stages rather 
than according to a continuous distribution as in our simulations – is based on at least 
three reasons: the first has to do with the desire to simplify the calculation procedure, 
the second (a consequence of the first) has to do with the communication between the 
Government of the Community and its users (a parallel can be drawn between this 
logic and that of the rules of fiscal taxation), the third has to do with a desire to 
maximise the impact of the different financing measures (the effect produced by 
passing from one financing bracket to another is much more perceptible for a school 
than a small improvement in the situation allowed by a movement on the distribution 
curve). 
Table 6 shows the effect of applying the solution proposed by the Government 
on the level of schools A and B (the same institutions already analysed in the case of 
the two previous situations). 
Table 6 – effects of the solution proposed by the Government 
 Baseline After applying the Government’s solution 
School SES volume of 
teaching 
hours  
Number of 
full-time 
teachers 
volume of 
teaching hours  
Gain in full-
time teachers 
Gain in 
teachers 
(relative) 
A 0.33 482 21.9 482 0 0 
B -2.11 194 8.8 251 +2.4 +29.72% 
 
4.3. Comparison of the scenarios and the solution proposed by the Government 
If we take a “micro” point of view for schools A and B, we see similarities between 
the two versions proposed: the school with a socially underprivileged population 
(school B) is favoured, in terms of school workforce, as  the number of teaching hours 
awarded after the simulations is superior to the base number of teaching hours; on the 
other hand, as for school A, with a more privileged population, the teaching 
workforce remains unchanged between the initial situation and after the simulation. 
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As for school B, it is interesting to note that the benefit recorded after the 
simulation is not of the same order depending on whether the distribution is 
continuous  (“realistic” simulation) or discrete (the Government’s bill): even if the 
gains recorded are close, the effects of financing by steps are more favourable for 
school B than financing through continuous distribution. It appears clear that this is 
the case of a school whose socio-economic index score corresponds to a benchmark 
establishing a division between two steps, which brought this school a maximisation 
of the financing allotted.  
5. Conclusion 
The simulations proposed in this article are based on the principle that the educational 
and pedagogical needs of a child depend on his social and cultural origin. They are 
intended to show the feasibility of a weighting of financing awarded to primary 
schools according to socio-economic indicators. The “Robin Hood” scenario is based 
on the principle of compensation, but adds an effect of incentive redistribution. The 
compensatory scenario, on the other hand, is based only on the principle of 
compensation, like the solution proposed by the Government. The “ideal” values to 
attribute to the different parameters of the simulator are not discussed here and are 
difficult to establish scientifically, in particular because the use of means by the 
organising authorities
20
 remains in the domain of the freedom of methods and because 
the organising authorities do not have to, as is the case in other systems, demonstrate 
the relative efficiency of their choices, taking into account the populations schooled.  
 
These simulations indicate that weighting financing according to socio-
economic parameters is possible and easily adaptable depending on clearly defined 
                                                 
20
 The organising authority of an educational institution is the authority, the natural person(s) or 
corporate body or bodies that are responsible for it. (law of 29 May 1959, called the “Pacte 
scolaire”) 
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priorities. However, some characteristics of the financing of primary education may 
neutralise part of the effects of the introduced weighting. It is a question here, for 
example, of the existence of minimum funding such as that foreseen by the 
Government to avoid having part-time positions with only a few hours: teaching 
designations would be made at the level of individual locations rather than at the 
institutional level, which can group together several school locations.  
 
The simulator also makes it possible to create financing scenarios based on 
several indicators. However, combining several indicators requires the utmost 
prudence in particular if there is a relationship between the different indicators used 
(for example: socio-economic index score and rate of grade repetition). Also, any 
financing scenario must include a reflection on the  strategies that certain school heads 
could develop to maximise their teaching workforce. As an example, if the political 
powers decide to increase the teaching staff in schools that have little grade repetition, 
headmasters could guide their pupils in difficulty towards special education or 
vocational education without penalising them with a failure. On the other hand, 
additional funding for schools with a high rate of grade repetition could incite 
headmasters to increase the number of failing students.  
 
We would like to insist on an important aspect of the study that led to this 
article: a single angle of investigation, the financial aspect, is not a miracle solution to 
all the difficulties encountered by the educational system in French-speaking 
Belgium. Greater funding can certainly help level out chances to succeed, but how 
should this extra funding be used? Continuing to do the same thing, considering for 
example that this supplement allotted to some schools exempts socially privileged 
schools from increasing social mixing, does not square with the principles promoted 
M. Demeuse et al. 
by the “Contrat pour l’Ecole”. The idea of raising resource allocation for the most 
underprivileged schools while transferring funding from the schools that refuse to 
increase social mixing (the “Robin Hood” effect) could be a strong signal but 
certainly difficult to support from a political point of view.  
 
The implementation of differentiated funding measures cannot overlook a 
reflection on how to evaluate these measures. Indicators making it possible to evaluate 
the possible social mixing resulting from these new measures should be built at the 
micro level, i.e. at the level of each school (average socio-economic index score, 
evolution of this score, standard deviation of the score, etc…) and/or at the system 
level (Demeuse and Baye, 2007; 2008) in order to evaluate the attainment of the goals 
and, if necessary, to end these measures once the goal of social mixing is reached.  
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